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Main references 
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  A theory of Participatory Democracy based on the 
real case of Porto Alegre, EER 2009. 
  The disadvantage of winning an election, Barcelona 
GSE WP 439. 
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Participatory democracy 
  A process of collective decision making that 
combines elements from both Direct Democracy and 
Representative Democracy.  
 
  Choices: 
  Policy proposals (DD) 
  Policy implementation (DD and RD) 
  Election of representatives (RD) 
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Institutions added to RD 
  Popular initiatives  
  Non-binding referenda initiated by: citizens, other 
parties, … 
  Participatory budgeting 
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Real examples 
 
  Non-binding referenda 
  Popular initiatives in the US 
  Town meetings in New England 
  School councils in Chicago  
  Participatory budgeting in Brazil 
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motivation 
  In a standard RD system the policy outcome can be 
very different from what voters want. 
  Need to transfer information about voters’ 
preferences to parties 
  Need to make parties responsive to that information 
(electoral accountability). 
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Two types of participation 
  Participation in assemblies/referenda: 
Based on models of meeting with costly 
participation. 
 
  Participation in elections: 
Combination of prospective and retrospective 
voting. 
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two asymmetries 
  Voters’ evaluation of different issues: 
  Popular issues 
  Electoral issues 
 
  Voters’ evaluation of different candidates: 
  Incumbent 
  Challenger 
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asymmetric evaluation of candidates 
  Voters use all the information available. 
  Voters evaluate candidates rather than policies. 
  Voters evaluate incumbent according to: 
  Performance on popular issues 
  Promises on electoral issues 
  Voters evaluate challenger according to: 
  Promises on electoral issues 
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Advantages of PD 
  Mechanism to implement DD’s policy outcome. 
  Implements an effective electoral control. 
  Direct information transmission of voters’ policy 
preferences. 
  Voters’ welfare increases with respect to RD, when 
incumbent and citizens’ policy preferences are 
aligned. 
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Other implications of PD 
  Incumbent advantage when incumbent and citizens’ 
policy preferences are aligned. 
  Incumbent disadvantage when incumbent and 
citizens’ policy preferences are not aligned. 
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The rest of the talk 
  Construct a formal model of PD combining elements 
from DD and RD. 
  Implications on agents’ behavior and policy 
outcomes. 
 
  Given a policy proposal: 
  Analyze the incumbent’s policy choice 
  Analyze the incumbent’s re-election process 
  Analyze policy proposal formation. 
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the whole game 
  (1) Citizens decide whether to attend a meeting. 
  (*) An aggregation rule selects the most preferred 
policy of the assembly (deliberative democracy). 
  (2) A proposal is submitted to the incumbent. 
  (3) The incumbent chooses a policy. 
  (4) Incumbent and challenger compete for votes. 
  (5) Citizens decide whether to reelect the 
incumbent.  
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Analysis in two parts 
  Part 1 
  Given a policy proposal: 
   The incumbent chooses a policy. 
   Incumbent and challenger compete for votes. 
   Citizens decide whether to reelect the incumbent. 
    
  Part 2 
  Citizens decide whether to attend a meeting. 
   An aggregation rule selects the most preferred 
policy of the assembly (deliberative democracy). 
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Part 1: incumbent’s decision and reelection 
  Two dimensional policy space [0,1] x [0,1] 
  x = electoral issue 
  y = popular issue 
  A continuum of voters with ideal points on issue x  
distributed uniformly over [0,1] 
  yp : citizens’ proposal on issue y 
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parties 
 
  Two parties: L and R 
  L is the incumbent 
  Parties’ ideal points: 
  xL = 0, xR = 1 
  yL = 0 
  Incumbent’s policy choice: y(L) 
  Parties’ electoral promises: x(L) and x(R) 
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policy and election stages 
  Given the policy proposal yp : 
1.  Incumbent implements y(L) 
2.  Parties propose x(L) and x(R) 
3.  Voters decide on the incumbent’s re-election 
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parties’ payoffs 
 
  Incumbent’s: 
  VL = - |yL - y(L) | + πL(K - |xL- x(L)|)+(1- πL)(- |xL- x(R)|) 
  Challenger’s: 
  VR = (1-πL)(K - |xR- x(R)|)+ πL(- |xR- x(L)|) 
 
  K ≥ 0 denotes the value of holding office. 
  If K = 0, politicians are only policy motivated. 
  If K very large, politicians are office motivated. 
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voters’ decision 
 
 
 
 
 
  µ = 0: Retrospective vote. 
  µ = 1: Prospective vote. ! 
UiL x(L),y(L)( ) = " 1" µ( ) y(L) " yp " µ xi " x(L)
UiR x(R)( ) = " xi " x(R)
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incumbent’s advantage and disadvantage 
 
 
 
 
 
  For 0 < µ < 1  
  If y(L) = yp the incumbent has a net advantage on the 
electoral issue. 
  If y(L) ≠ yp the incumbent has a disadvantage on the 
popular issue and an advantage on the electoral issue. 
! 
UiL x(L),y(L)( ) = " 1" µ( ) y(L) " yp " µ xi " x(L)
UiR x(R)( ) = " xi " x(R)
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incumbent’s trade-off 
  The incumbent always has a strategy that 
guarantees his re-election. 
  But it may be too costly... 
  The incumbent is not re-elected in equilibrium when 
  large yp: non-aligned preferences 
  small K: incumbent is strongly policy motivated 
  large µ : strong electoral competition 
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 if L wins           if R wins 
  Policy outcomes on the 
popular issue are closer to the 
proposal for medium values of 
µ. 
  Policy outcomes on the 
electoral issue coincide with 
the median for large values of 
µ. 
  Policy outcomes on the 
popular issue reflect only the 
incumbents’ preferences. 
  Policy outcomes on the 
electoral issue are closer to 
the median for larger values 
of µ. 
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Part 2: formation of policy proposal 
Based on models of meeting with costly 
participation. 
 
Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner, AER 2000 
 
  Policy space = [0,1] 
  Policy implemented: y(L) 
  Policy proposal: yp 
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Meetings with costly participation 
  Citizens: i = 1, ..., N 
  Citizen i’s ideal point: yi 
  F(yi) = p.d.f. on [0,1] with y1 = 0 and yN = 1 
  Population median: y* 
 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
−−−=
otherwise
attendsiif
awhere
cayyayV
i
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0
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Participation  
  If c is large enough then there is a unique 
equilibrium in which nobody attends the meeting. 
  If c is small enough then nobody attending the 
meeting is not an equilibrium because 
  Any i such that                    is better off attending. 
 
cyy Li >−
yL yL+b yL-b 0 1 
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Existence of equilibrium 
  Existence of an interior equilibrium depends on the 
specific distribution of voters’ preferences. 
 
  Existence of an extreme equilibrium does not 
depend on the specific distribution of voters’ 
preferences. 
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Alignment of preferences 
 
 
 
 
  Necessary condition for existence of an Interior 
Equilibrium with an Extreme Incumbent. 
  Necessary condition for existence of Equilibrium 
with a Moderate Incumbent. 
( )bybyy LL +−∈ ,*
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Main results 
  Non-participation of the moderates. 
  Moderation as a relative concept. 
  Importance of alignment. 
  Low participation. 
  Instability. 
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Alignment of preferences 
  According to the citizen-candidate model we would 
always have alignment of preferences. 
  Non-alignment of preferences induces instability 
that could imply a change of candidate or a change 
of system. 
  Incumbent’s preferences, society’s preferences, 
and the relevant policy space change over time, 
thus instability is not necessarily persistent. 
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Participatory democracy  
Provides information on voters’ preferences to parties 
and to voters. 
 
and 
 
  Destroys parties’ monopoly on agenda setting. 
  Makes lobbying less successful. 
 
thus improves social welfare 
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Further research 
  Need of better explanations for the participation 
stage: 
 
1.  Origin of popular initiatives 
2.  Deliberation stage 
3.  Aggregation of preferences for policy proposal 
4.  Citizens’ participation 
 
  Do people compare incumbents and challengers in a 
symmetric way? 
  Role of lobbies at both stages. 
 
